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AMERICA FIRST? HOW TO TAKE A BALANCED APPROACH
TO REFORMING THE ISDS PROVISION IN NAFTA
By
Robert J Gross Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the election of President Donald J. Trump and his policy of “America First,” the
Trump Administration has either re-evaluated or withdrawn from many of the United
States’ commitments abroad.1 One example garnering ongoing media attention is the
renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”). 2 NAFTA
positively impacted the United States’ economy, including increasing trade from $297
billion US to $1.17 trillion US between The United States of America, Canada, and Mexico
from 1992-2017, lowering consumer prices due to lower tariffs, and increasing foreign
direct investment from Canada and Mexico.3 While NAFTA has several positive aspects,
President Trump’s views on NAFTA may be influenced by the negative impact NAFTA
has had on United States’ manufacturing and President Trump’s supporters.4 If the Trump
Administration plans to proceed in the renegotiation of NAFTA or if Congress rejects the
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement,5 one possible amendment could be the addition
of procedural safeguards, based on the Canadian-European Union Comprehensive

* Robert J Gross Jr. was a 2017-2018 Senior Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2019 Juris Doctor
candidate at Penn State Law.
See Oren Dorell, Trumps Foreign Policy Often Puts ‘America First’ and Alone, USA TODAY (Jan. 19, 2018,
1:26
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/01/19/trumps-foreign-policy-often-putamerica-first-and-alone/1036558001/ (Examples of this shift include the withdrawal from the Paris Climate
Deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran).
1

2

Id.; see also President Donald J. Trump is Keeping His Promise to Renegotiate NAFTA, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-keepingpromise-renegotiate-nafta/?utm_source=link&utm_medium=header.
3

Kimberly Amadeo, Six Advantages of NAFTA: The Hidden Benefits of NAFTA, THE BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/advantages-of-nafta-3306271.
4

See Jacqueline Granados, Article, Investor Protection and Foreign Investment Under NAFTA Chapter 11:
Prospects for the Western Hemisphere Under Chapter 17 of the FTAA, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
189, 195 (2005); In a return to familiar topics, Trump threatens to terminate NAFTA and insists Mexico will
pay for the border wall, LA TIMES (Aug. 27, 2017, 4:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-polupdates-trump-tweets-nafta-renegotiation-htmlstory.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2019).
Katie Lobosco, What’s New in the US, Canada and Mexico
https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/01/politics/nafta-usmca-differences/index.html.
5
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Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”),6 to protect State sovereignty from foreign
investors.
This paper explores whether the Trump Administration should continue weakening the
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) provision found within Chapter 11 of
NAFTA.7 Specifically, this paper argues that the ISDS provisions in NAFTA should be
altered and modeled after the CETA example. Part II explores the history of NAFTA, and
Part III discusses the ISDS provisions. Part IV then analyzes Mobil Investments Canada &
Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada (“Mobil v. Canada”), an International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”)8 case. Mobil v. Canada exemplifies ISDS arbitration
and underscores the main concern with the future of ISDS arbitration in NAFTA, namely,
investor’s unprecedented ability to affect regulatory regimes and affect State sovereignty.
Part V explores the different arguments in support of and against ISDS arbitration in
NAFTA and presents an alternative to the ISDS provision that may bridge the gap between
Anti- and Pro-ISDS advocates.
II.

NEGOTIATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

In August 1992, approximately a year of negotiations between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico (collectively “the Signatory States”) concluded in Washington, D.C.9
Although the negotiations began in June 1991, the process was onerous for the Signatory
States because it took a long time for the Signatory States to take the discussions seriously
and offer concessions to one another.10
In December 1991, the three parties met in Dallas, Texas to formally agree on the
NAFTA’s provisions.11 The Signatory States focused their efforts on the least contentious
provisions and agreed to officially negotiate hotly-contested terms at a later period.12
While the least contentious provisions helped negotiations gain momentum, that

6

Canadian-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 2016,
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/ceta-aecg/text-texte/toc-tdm.aspx?lang=eng.
7

See North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 1992 WL 812394, *1 (1993);
See NAFTA Secretariat, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Texts-of-the-Agreement/North-AmericanFree-Trade-Agreement?mvid=1&secid=539c50ef-51c1-489b-808b-9e20c9872d25#A1101
(hereinafter
“NAFTA”).
8

See INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/.

Jennifer A Heindl, Article, Toward a History of NAFTA’s Chapter Eleven, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 672,
679 (2006) (hereinafter “Heindl”).
9

10

Id.

11

Id. at 680.

12

Id.
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momentum did not last long.13 Negotiations stalled because Canada wished to keep the
provisions of NAFTA close to the terms of the previous Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement (“CUSFTA”), and because Mexico objected to adding expropriation clauses to
the agreement.14
A.

Canada’s Issue with NAFTA

Canada feared that a new free trade agreement would shift the economic status quo
between the United States and Canada.15 Prior to NAFTA, Canada and the United States
had previously negotiated a free trade agreement which went into effect in 1989:
CUSFTA.16 Prior to CUSFTA, and continuing through NAFTA negotiations, the Canadian
government was reluctant to enter into a trade agreement with the United States, fearing
economic supremacy by the United States.17 After CUSFTA was in effect, Mexico entered
into trade negotiations with the United States and functionally forced Canada to enter into
the NAFTA negotiations.18 In the negotiation process, Canada remained reluctant to agree
to the new treaty.19 Canada objected to many of NAFTA’s provisions, which it deemed
substantially different from the provisions in CUSFTA.20 For example, in CUSFTA,
Canada retained the right to review new foreign investments made in its territory.21
Throughout the renegotiation process, Canada advocated zealously for the retention of the
right for Canada to review these new investments.22 Canada’s advocacy eventually
persuaded Mexico to join the plight, and the final version of NAFTA adopted the right to
review new investments.23 Negotations moved forward.

13

Heindl, supra note 9, at 680.

14

Id.

15

See id. at 676.

16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id. (Canada was forced back into negotiations, fearing falling economically behind Mexico and the United
States).
19

Heindl, supra note 9, at at 681.

20

Id. at 680.

21

Id. at 680-81.

22

Id.

23

See id. at 683.
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B.

Mexico’s Issue with NAFTA

Mexico took issue with the expropriation provision in NAFTA, which it deemed to be
in conflict with the Mexican Constitution’s “Calvo Clause.”24 Prior to the enactment of
NAFTA, Mexico’s Constitution included the Calvo Clause, which allowed the Mexican
Government to expropriate foreign investors’ property to the State.25 During NAFTA
negotiations, the United States proposed an expropriation clause that guaranteed the
“prompt, adequate, and effective” compensation for any taking by the Mexican
Government.26 However, such a clause would be in direct conflict with the Calvo Clause,
which “establishe[d] that no foreigner c[ould] have more rights than a Mexican, including
rights of protection against expropriation.”27 The Mexican government owned all natural
resources on their land.28 The Calvo Clause also established that foreign investors could
not seek assistance from their home nations when suing the Mexican government for
expropriations.29 United States’ proposed expropriation clause was unconstitutional under
the Calvo Clause, because it would give foreign investors greater rights than Mexican
citizens.30 After numerous negotiations, Mexico and the United States eventually
substituted “prompt, adequate, and effective” with “fair market value,” which allowed the
negotiations to proceed.31
III.

THE ISDS PROVISIONS WITHIN NAFTA
A.

Chapter 11 Section A: Substantive Prohibitions and Protections

Section A of Chapter 11 details the substantive prohibitions applicable to the Signatory
States and the substantive protections for foreign investors.32 Section A of NAFTA applies:
(1) when one State’s regulations affect investors of another State; (2) to investments of
individual investors of another State; and (3) to all investments in the State, if sections 1106

24

Heindl, supra note 9, at 683.

Id. at 863; Expropriation is the “governmental taking or modification of an individual’s property rights,
[especially] by eminent domain.” Expropriation, BLACK’S LAW Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
25

26

See Heindl, supra note 9, at 681.

27

Id. at 678.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 681.

31

Id. at 682.

32

See NAFTA, supra note 7, at *1.
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or 1114 apply.33 Substantively, the ISDS provisions prohibit a State from favoring
domestic investors over foreign investors.34 In addition, a State cannot favor a foreign
investor of one of the Signatory States over an investor from another Signatory State.35 For
example, Canada cannot give preferential treatment to Mexican foreign investors over
foreign investors from the United States. A second substantive provision states that a
Signatory State cannot adopt regulations that require an investor take certain actions,
including, but not limited to, mandating the amount of goods and services to export, forcing
the investor to purchase manufactured goods from the Signatory State, or acting as the
exclusive provider of goods and services.”36 States also cannot place conditions on
investment, within their territories, to achieve a percentage of domestic content, to require
the purchase or use of goods in their territories, relate the volume of imports to the volume
of exports, or restrict the sale of goods within their territories.37 Finally, a Signatory State
may expropriate an investor’s property only for a non-discriminatory public purpose, in
accordance to due process rights, and must compensate the investor at fair-market value.38
B.

Chapter 11, Section B: Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Chapter 11, Section B defines NAFTA’s dispute resolution mechanism, which
arguably has pitfalls that allow investors suing a state to circumvent the State’s governance
scheme and to infringe on a State’s sovereignty. The goal of the dispute resolution
mechanism in NAFTA is to provide equal treatment for all parties and to create parity
across the Signatory State’s laws.39 When a dispute arises, the parties must negotiate before
submitting a claim to arbitration.40 Additionally, the aggrieved party must wait six months,
from the time that the claim arose, before submitting their claim to arbitration.41
Section B allows the aggrieved party to submit his or her claims in three separate
manners.42 The aggrieved party can choose ICSID as the forum for the arbitration, ad-hoc
arbitration using the ICSID rules, or the United Nations Commission on International Trade

33

NAFTA, supra note 7, at *1.

34

See id. at *1.

35

Id. at *1-2.

36

See id. at *2-3.

37

See id. at *2-3.

38

Id. at *6-7.

39

NAFTA, supra note 7, at *7.

40

Id. at *8.

41

Id.

42

Id.
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(“UNCITRAL”) tribunals.43 Chapter 11 also states that three arbitrators are the default
configuration of the tribunal – each party selects one arbitrator, and then the parties’
arbitrators mutually select a president arbitrator.44 If the arbitral tribunal has not been
constituted within ninety days from the initiation of the claim, the ICSID’s SecretaryGeneral appoints the arbitrators, but, due to NAFTA rules, the Secretary-General cannot
appoint the president arbitrator.45
When a final award is rendered, the tribunal may award money damages and
restitution.46 The award rendered will have no effect on parties not subject to the
arbitration.47 After an award is rendered, a party cannot seek enforcement until 120 days
have elapsed and no party has requested annulment or a revision.48 Notably absent from
this dispute resolution mechanism is any ability to stop claims from proceeding in court
and through arbitration, any semi-permanent members of an arbital tribunal who are
familiar with NAFTA specific provisions and issues, or any right to appeal of substantive
issues.
IV.
EXEMPLIFYING THE ISSUES WITH THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM:
CIRCUMVENTING STATES’ GOVERNANCE AND INFRINGING ON STATES’ SOVEREIGNTY
A.

Using NAFTA’s Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Mobil’s Case

In Mobil Investments Canada & Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada (“Mobil v. Canada”),
Mobil Investments Canada and Murphy Oil (collectively “Claimants”) sued Canada under
the ISDS framework established in NAFTA’s Chapter 11.49 The dispute arose from the
application of the Guidelines for Research and Development Expenditures adopted in 2004
by the Canadian Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (“2004

43

NAFTA,
supra
note
7,
at
*8;
About
UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about_us.html (last visited Sep 9, 2018).
44

Id. at *9.

45

See id. at *9-10.

46

Id. at *13.

47

Id. at *13-14.

48

Id.

49

UNCITRAL,

See Mobil Investments Canada & Murphy Oil Corp. v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision,
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, ¶ 1 (May 22, 2012),
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1145.pdf (hereinafter “Mobil v. Canada”).
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Guidelines”).50 The Claimants asserted that Canada violated Articles 1105,51 1106,52 and
110853 of NAFTA’s Chapter 11.54 More specifically, the Claimants alleged that Canada
“violated Article 1105 of NAFTA by ‘failing to provide a stable regulatory framework for
the conduct of petroleum development projects in the Newfoundland offshore area and by
frustrating Claimants’ legitimate expectations with regard to that regulatory
framework.’”55 The Claimants alleged the Board violated Article 1106 by instituting a
regulatory scheme that required performance on the part of the Claimants by requiring the
Claimants to spenda minimum amount of money on Research and Development (“R&D”)
and Education and Training (“E&T”) within the Providence, regardless of the Claimants’
need for that R&D.56 Finally, the Claimants alleged that this regulatory regime did not fall
within the purview of Canada’s reservation under Article 1108. 57
The Tribunal rejected the Claimants’ Article 1105 claims. The Tribunal held that the
Board made no promises, “either expressly or by a pattern of behavior.”58 The Tribunal
also found no provision in the Accord Acts limited the Board’s ability to implement a
minimum amount of R&D expenditures that the Claimants had to meet.59 Finally, the
Tribunal rejected the Claimants’ argument that the Benefits Plans constituted a contractual
relationship to which the Board could not make material changes.60

50

See Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶1.

51

NAFTA, supra note 7, *2 (establishing the minimum standard of treatment required in relation to investors
from other Signatory States. A party must afford foreign investors from Signatory States the minimum
customary rights under international law.)
52

Id. (outlining the prohibitions against a Signatory State requiring performance by a foreign investor. More
specifically, Mobil v. Canada dealt with Article 1106(1)(c) which states, “No Party may impose or enforce
any of the following requirements, or enforce any commitment or undertaking, in connection with the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of an investment of an investor of
a Party or of a non-Party in its territory: . . . to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or
services provided in its territory, or to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory.”)
Id. (outlining when a Signatory State’s pre-existing non-conforming duty for foreign investors can be
exempted from the requirements of NAFTA through reservation.)
53

54

Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 111; Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 172; Mobil v. Canada,
supra note 51, at ¶¶ 247-249
55

Id. at ¶ 111.

56

See id. at ¶ 172.

57

See id. at ¶¶ 247-249.

58

Id. at ¶ 156.

59

Id. at ¶ 159.

60

Id. at ¶ 166.
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The Tribunal ruled in favor of the Claimaints on their Article 1106 claim, holding that
the 2004 Guidelines sufficiently forced the investor to perform.61 The Tribunal
acknowledged Canada’s argument that there was no express reference to R&D or E&T
within Article 1106.62 However, the Tribunal rejected Canada’s argument that R&D and
E&T did not fall within the scope of the word “services.”63
The Tribunal ruled in favor of Claimants on their Article 1108 claim. The Claimants
asserted that the 2004 Guidelines were not consistent with Canada’s NAFTA reservations
due to the Board’s post-2004 requirement that Claimants meet a certain threshold
expenditure on R&D.64 The Tribunal reasoned that this policy change “amount[ed] to more
than mere changes in the methodology, but in fact reflect[ed] a fundamentally different
approach to compliance, compared to the Federal Accord Act and the Hibernia and Terra
Nova Benefits Plans.”65 The Tribunal held that the 2004 Guidelines instituted “a different
form of Board oversight than previously existed.”66 Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded
that the 2004 Guidelines were inconsistent with the reservation.67
On January 16, 2015, Mobil Investments Canada Inc. (“Mobil”), one of the collective
Claimants in the prior arbitration, filed a subsequent Request for Arbitration.68 In Mobil’s
request, they stated that the issue in dispute was the amount of damages owed to Mobil.69
Mobil also argued that it is subject to ongoing damages due to the Board’s continued
reliance on the 2004 Guidelines.70 Mobil requested a decision regarding damages in its
favor, including damages, interest, taxes, and fees for commencing the arbitration.71

61

Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 234.

62

See id. at ¶ 215.

63

See id. at ¶ 216.

64

Id. at ¶¶ 393-95.

65

Id. at ¶ 398.

66

Id. at ¶ 404.

67

Id. at ¶ 413.

68

See Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v. Canada, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
request
for
arbitration,
*1,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/MobilRequestArbitrationREDACTED.pdf.
69

Id. at ¶ 27.

70

Id. at ¶ 49.

71

Mobil Investments Canada Inc. v. Canada, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
request
for
arbitration,
¶
55,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/MobilRequestArbitrationREDACTED.pdf.
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Additionally, the Canadian Superior Court of Justice dismissed Canada’s claim seeking to
set aside the arbitral award.72
B.

Mobil Exemplifies one of the Issues with the NAFTA’s Dispute Resolution
Scheme

Mobil v. Canada exemplies the ability for foreign investors to circumvent a State’s
traditional legal system with little difficulty.73 In Mobil, the Canadian Court of Appeals
rejected Mobil’s claims,74 but because of the ISDS provisions in NAFTA, the Claimants
subsequently took their claims to arbitration.75 While the Canadian Court of Appeals found
that the Board could require the Claimants to meet minimum levels in R&D within the
Providence,76 the Tribunal found differently.77 Moreover, Canadian citizens had no
recourse after the Tribunal’s decision, even though public funds paid Mobil for its lost
profits awarded through arbitration.78 In essence, Mobil was not compelled to submit itself
to Canada’s court system, given NAFTA’s alternative dispute resolution mechanism.
Critics of the ISDS have voiced their concerns that NAFTA’s dispute resolution
mechanism limits a State’s sovereignty. Consider Mobil v. Canada, in which Canada’s
only recourse against the arbitral decision was to remove the guidelines or subject itself to
repeated arbitrations from oil companies. In BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina,
Chief Justice Roberts noted this same concern stating that with the alternative dispute
resolution mechanism in place, ISDS arbitral tribunals have the ability to stand in judgment

72

Attorney General of Canada v. Mobil et al., 2016 O.N.S.C. 790 (Can.), available at
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7160.pdf.
73

See 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) from NAFTA and Other Pacts, CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2017), available at
https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf.
74

Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 355; Mobil v. Canada, supra note 51, at ¶ 86.

75

Id. at ¶ 86.

76

See id. at ¶ 86.

77

Id. at ¶ 234; Id. at ¶ 398.

78

See 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) from NAFTA and Other Pacts, CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2017), available at
https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf.
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of a nation’s sovereign regulations.79 Canada, being the most sued country under ISDS
provisions in the world and paying a total of $107 million as of 2015,80 would likely agree.
V.

RENEGOTIATION OF NAFTA: THE CASE FOR AMERICA FIRST

Arguing an America First stance, President Trump has pushed for seismic changes in
how the United States approaches foreign policy.81 Examples of these changes include the
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the
refusal to certify Iranian compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the
repeated rebukes of the United States’ closest allies.82 Ben Rhodes, the Former National
Security Advisor under President Obama, has described President Trump’s approach not
as “taking aim at some of our legacy accomplishments, but [more of a] disavowal of an
entire approach to the world.”83
Against this backdrop, the Trump Administration hopes to weaken NAFTA,84
including NAFTA’s ISDS provisions.85 While the Trump Administration is unsure about
the best way to tackle ISDS, Mr. Lighthizer, the United States Trade Representative, has
stated that one option is to allow countries to opt-in to the ISDS provisions.86 This change
would essentially allow countries to decide, on their own terms, whether they would be
subject to the provisions of Chapter 11.87

79

See 230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) from NAFTA and Other Pacts, CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2017), available at
https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf
80

Sunny Freedman, NAFTA's Chapter 11 Makes Canada Most-Sued Country Under Free Trade Tribunals,
HUFFINGTON
POST,
https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/01/14/canada-sued-investor-state-disputeccpa_n_6471460.html.
See How does Obama’s Foreign Policy Look a Year Into Trump, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.eu/article/how-does-barack-obama-foreign-policy-look-a-year-into-donald-trumppresidency/ (last visited Sep. 9, 2018).
81

82

See id.

83

Id.

84

See Trump Administration Announces Intent to Renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-trump-administration-announces (last visited Sep. 9, 2018).
See On NAFTA, Donald Trump’s Most Dangerous Opponents are at Home, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 31,
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21727912-business-congress-and-law-hefaces-obstacles-nafta-donald-trumps-most.
85

86

Id.

87

See Adam Behsudi, Investor Dispute Provision Still at Impasse Ahead of Washington Meeting, POLITICO
(Feb. 21, 2018, 1:22 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/21/canada-stands-firm-on-pursuingbilateral-investor-dispute-process-with-mexico-in-nafta-356665.
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A.

General Criticisms of the ISDS Arbitration Scheme in NAFTA

The Trump Administration’s goal in renegotiating NAFTA is to “support higherpaying jobs in the United States and to grow the U.S. economy by improving U.S.
opportunities to trade with Canada and Mexico,”88 but he has received sharp criticisms
from American corporations.89 In fact, several prominent business organizations, such as
the United States Chamber of Commerce, Business Roundtable, and the National
Association of Manufacturers, delivered a letter to Mr. Lighthizer stating that “[a]ttempts
to eliminate or weaken ISDS will harm American businesses and workers and, as a
consequence, will serve to undermine business community support for the [NAFTA]
moderni[z]ation negotiations.”90
United States corporations have more than enough reasons to favor ISDS and its
retention.91 United States investors rely heavily on NAFTA’s Chapter 11 when investing
in Mexico.92 From 2014 to 2015, United States investors’ foreign direct investment in
Mexico increased 1,003%, for a total of $15.7 billion.93 NAFTA disputes constitute a
significant portion of the total amount of ICSID arbitrations, with United States investors
constituting 138 of the total claimants.94
Even though solid arguments for the retention of the ISDS provisions exist, such as
protecting foreign investors and ensuring that other countries afford constitutional
protections to investors when they do business in foreign countries,95 critics have
continually pointed out the shortcoming with NAFTA’s Chapter 11. For example, in a
letter, approximately 230 law professors and economics professors urged President Trump
to remove ISDS from NAFTA and to not include an ISDS provision within the TransPacific Partnership because of the provision’s alleged negative effects.96 They argued that

88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Business
Groups
Fire
Warning
Shot
Over
NAFTA,
FINANCIAL
https://www.ft.com/content/f8bd9e3c-88e3-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787 (last visited Sep. 9, 2018).

TIMES,

91

See Carlos Alverado, 200 Billion Reasons for Keeping Nafta, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 26,
2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/04/26/200-billion-reasons-for-keeping-nafta/.
92

See Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

Catherine H. Gibson, ISDS and NAFTA – and ISDS Alternatives, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Nov. 29,
2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/11/29/isds-in-nafta-and-isds-alternatives/.
95

96

230 Law and Economics Professors Urge President Trump to Remove Investor-State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) from NAFTA and Other Pacts, CITIZEN (Oct. 25, 2017), available at
https://www.citizen.org/system/files/case_documents/isds-law-economics-professors-letter-oct-2017_2.pdf.
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the problem with ISDS is that the provisions allow a private investor to circumvent the
previously established mechanisms for dispute resolution, the domestic court systems.97
The ability to sue a State directly is also an issue, because the ISDS provisions of
NAFTA allows foreign investors to skirt the “the robust, nuanced, and democraticallyresponsive U.S. legal framework.”98 Over the history of the United States, the United States
citizenry has consistently refined the legal process, both from a procedural and an
evidentiary standpoint, to make the process fair and consistent with the opinions of the
American electorate.99 ISDS allows foreign investors to succeed in claims that would have
otherwise been rejected by a Signatory State’s court system, because ISDS arbitrations lack
some of the procedural and evidentiary safeguards found in traditional court
proceedings.100 Some of the safeguards not included in the ISDS are the ability to enjoin
domestic interests in the dispute resolution proceedings and an appeals process for mistakes
of law.101
Futhermore, ISDS reduces the administrative costs of moving operations to Canada or
Mexico,102 which in turn, reduces the risk to American companies seeking to relocate their
manufacturing overseas, because it reduces the potential costs associated with compliance
of violations of foreign regulatory regimes.103 In a letter written to Mr. Lighthizer, the
United States Trade Representative, Congressional members called on the Trump
Administration to use an open process and renegotiate NAFTA in a way that helps
American workers.104
The United States investment in foreign manufacturing has consistently increased
under NAFTA, while American manufacturing has stagnated.105 NAFTA significantly
burdened the American worker’s bargaining power by strengthening United States
corporations’ ability to lower workers’ wages by easing a corporation’s ability to move
operations to Mexico.106 NAFTA reduced the costs associated with foreign direct
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investment, allowing American companies to move their manufacturing to either Canada
or Mexico, while still being able to sell their products effortlessly within the United
States.107 NAFTA also gave United States companies the upper hand in wage negotiations,
effectively permitting these companies to threaten moving their production out of the
United States to reduce labor costs.108 The ISDS provisions of Chapter 11 shield these new
benefits that hurt American workers, because it further reduces these costs by allowing
foreign investors to directly sue the Signatory States for objectionable regulatory
regimes.109
B.

ISDS Alternatives: A Balanced-Approach to America First

While there are many who believe ISDS is harmful to the United States economy, the
issue remains: If the Signatory States remove the dispute resolution mechanism in NAFTA,
what will replace it?110 One alternative, worth the attention of the Signatory States, is
Canada’s proposal to base the new ISDS provision off their Canada-European Union
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement.111 CETA is a novel approach to deal with
the ISDS issues, because CETA sets up a permanent arbitral tribunal for investment
disputes.112 CETA resembles NAFTA in many respects, including its inclusion of
substantive protections for investors, direct claims against signatory parties, and
expropriation protection.113 However, CETA also provides additional safeguards in the
dispute resolution process by creating an appeals process, a permanent tribunal with
dedicated arbitrators, and the requirement for mediation.114
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CETA has established a robust dispute resolution process. CETA established a
permanent arbitral tribunal for the resolution of investment disputes,115 which consists
consists of fifteen arbitrators – five from Canada, five from the European Union, and five
arbitrators without a designated county affiliation.116 A CETA joint committee selects the
arbitrators to five-year terms with a one-time option to renew their term.117 Arbitrators can
finish any claims they started during their term, if the arbitration takes longer than their
term.118 The President of the Tribunal decides which three arbitrators from the pool will
hear the cases.119 Alternatively, the parties can agree that a dispute can be heard by one
arbitrator.120 CETA further establishes an Appellate Tribunal to review awards within
ninety days of the final decision.121 If a claimant decides an appeal is warranted, they have
90 days, from the date of the decision, to initiate the appeal or else the decision becomes
permanent.122 Finally, CETA requires mediation and negotiation, a 180-day cooling off
period, disallowance of claims to proceed concurrently in a State’s court system and the
arbitral tribunal, and transparency regarding the award.123 Much like NAFTA’s current
Chapter 11, CETA allows the claimant to elect which rules to use in the arbitration, such
as the UNCITRAL or ICSID rules.124
This CETA dispute resolution system could be a substantial compromise between the
two competing interests of State sovereignty, workers’ interests, and the interests of
corporations in the NAFTA renegotiation debate. Indeed, Canada and the European Union
noted that the CETA’s ISDS provisions were designed to protect a nation’s ability to freely
regulate industry within their counties, while retaining the benefits of free trade
agreements.125 They also noted that CETA was a departure from the status quo of ISDS
provisions.126
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Some argue that CETA will merely add delays to a system that is intended to be fast
and efficient.127 While this is a valid concern due to the added procedural protections, other
provisions found within CETA help expedite the arbitral process.128 One such provision is
that the final award must be rendered within twenty-four months, and if the time limit needs
to be extended, the tribunal must set out a statement of reasons for the delay.129 NAFTA
does not appear to have a similar provision. The dispute resolution mechanism laid out in
CETA would raise some of the costs on foreign investors in North America, while
simultaneously retaining the substantive protections for which United States corporations
are fighting. The administrative costs on companies pursuing foreign direct investment are
increased by adding procedural safeguards for the Signatory States through the addition of
an appellate procedure, removing the ad hoc nature of current ISDS tribunals with a semipermanent tribunal, and maintaining the substantive protections for corporations.
Additionally, the CETA system allows for lawyers well-versed in international law and
who have experience in the types of interntional investment issues typically presented at
NAFTA tribunals to be appointed to the semi-permanent tribunal.130 The system would
lead to more consistent results,131 and as a byproduct of due process, the revised ISDS
provision would create a more palatable result for the Signatory States, foreign investors,
and citizens of the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The appellate review process is a
significant departure from the ISDS provision in NAFTA and many other arbitration
agreements.132 CETA allows for the review of both errors of law and errors of fact.133
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ISDS dispute resolution mechanism outlined in NAFTA merits revision. As
exemplified in Mobil v. Canada, the ISDS provision facilitates investors ability to
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circumvent a State’s regulatory scheme and infringe on a State’s sovereignty.134 At the
same time, ISDS critics point to the negative repercussions to the American workers, even
though corporations and the economy have benefited from NAFTA in general and the ISDS
provision in specific.135 President Trump and the United States Congress still have an
opportunity to bridge the divide by adopting a balanced-approach to President Trump’s
America First approach, modeling a new dispute resolution provision in NAFTA after
CETA.136
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